Ruzveltov telegram Musoliniju povodom ulaska Italije u rat

[ACHTUNG]

29. april 1940.

MY DEAR SIGNOR MUSSOLINI:

I am requesting my Ambassador in Rome to deliver this message to Your Excellency. Because of the long delays in the transmission of mail, I am conveying to you in this manner a message which under more normal conditions I would have transmitted by means of a personal letter.

During the past days the scope of the conflict in Europe has further widened and two more neutral nations which had done their utmost to avoid involvement in war have been drawn by force into the scene of hostilities.

The people of the United States, as I have already sent you word, have seen with the deepest satisfaction the policy of the Italian Government in exerting every effort to prevent war from spreading to southern and to southeastern Europe. I fully recognize the profound truth of the statement you made recently to my representative, Mr. Welles, that because of Italy's determination to limit, so far as might be possible, the spread of the conflict, more than 200,000,000 of people in the region of the Mediterranean are still at peace.

A further extension of the area of hostilities, which would bring into the war still other nations which have been seeking to maintain their neutrality, would necessarily have far-reaching and unforeseeable consequences, not only in Europe, but also in the Near and the Far East, in Africa, and in the three Americas. No man can today predict with assurance, should such a further extension take place, what the ultimate result might be-or foretell what nations, however determined they may today be to remain at peace, might yet eventually find it imperative in their own defense to enter the war.

I am, as you know, a realist. As occurs inevitably in every contest, the participants themselves are far less able to predict the eventual outcome of the struggle than the onlookers who are near at hand, and these latter perhaps are not in as good a position to determine which may be the winning side as those onlookers who may be still farther away. By reason of its geographical position, this country has a panoramic view of the existing hostilities in Europe. Because of the many imponderables involved, I see no reason to anticipate that any one nation, or any one combination of nations, can successfully undertake to dominate either the continent of Europe or much less a greater part of the world.

I earnestly hope that the powerful influence of Italy and of the United States-an influence which is very strong so long as they remain at peace-may yet be exercised, when the appropriate opportunity is presented in behalf of the negotiation of a just and stable peace which will permit of the reconstruction of a gravely stricken world.

With the assurance of my highest regard, believe me

Yours very sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

[ACHTUNG]

2. maj 1940.

1. If two nations, Denmark and Norway, have been involved in the war, the responsibility does not fall upon Germany, but upon the initiatives of the Allies.

2. Italy's non-belligerency has effectively insured peace for two hundred millions of men, but notwithstanding, Italian merchant traffic is subjected to a constant surveillance that is vexatious and harmful.

3. As far as I know, Germany is opposed to a further extension of the conflict, and Italy likewise. We must learn whether this is also the Franco-British aim.

4. The only European nation that dominates a large part of the world and possesses a monopoly on many basic raw materials is Great Britain. Italy has no programs of that kind, but declares that no peace is possible without the fundamental problems of Italian liberty being settled.

5. As to the repercussions which an extension of the war fronts might have on the three Americas, I call attention to the fact that Italy has never concerned itself with the relations of the American republics with each other and with the United States (thereby respecting the Monroe Doctrine), and might therefore ask for "reciprocity" with regard to European affairs.

6. Whenever conditions permit, and always starting with the recognition of the actual and accomplished facts, Italy is ready to make her contribution to a better order of the world.

MUSSOLINI

[ACHTUNG]

14. maj 1940.

 I do not know what Your Excellency plans or proposes but reports reaching me from many sources, to the effect that you may be contemplating early entry into the war, have given me great concern.

I send you this appeal as the head of a peaceful nation and as a close friend of twenty other American Republics. All of us in the Americas feel in our hearts that tonight the whole world faces a threat which opposes every teaching of Christ, every philosophy of all the great teachers of mankind over thousands of years.

Forces of slaughter, forces which deny God, forces which seek to dominate mankind by fear rather than by reason seem at this moment to be extending their conquest against a hundred million human beings who have no desire but peace.

You whom the great Italian people call their leader have it in your own hands to stay the spread of this war to another group of 200,000,000 human souls in the Mediterranean Area.

I have sent word to Your Excellency before that I am a realist. As a realist you also will, I know, recognize that if this war should extend throughout the world it would pass beyond the control of heads of States, would encompass the destruction of millions of lives and the best of what we call the liberty and culture of civilization. And no man, no matter, how omniscient, how powerful, can foretell the result either to himself or his own people.

Therefore, I make the simple plea that you, responsible for Italy, withhold your hand, stay wholly apart from any war and refrain from any threat of attack. So only can you help mankind tonight and tomorrow and in the pages of history.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

[ACHTUNG]

18. maj 1940.

I reply to the message which you sent me at noon on the fourteenth instant. I understand perfectly the motives by which it was inspired and I consider it worthy of much respect and of the greatest consideration but there are two fundamental motives which cannot escape your spirit of political realism and those are that Italy is and intends to remain allied with Germany and that Italy cannot remain absent at a moment in which the fate of Europe is at stake. I cannot therefore but reconfirm the substance of my first message.

MUSSOLINI

[ACHTUNG]

Pogledajte prvi Musolinijev odgovor, podvukao sam jedan jako interesantan motiv.

[baclawa]

Pogledajte prvi Musolinijev odgovor, podvukao sam jedan jako interesantan motiv.

To je i dobio. Ali na Jalti

[Director]

Grof Ciano opisuje taj dogadaj otprilike ovako : Musolini je obavešten da ce Italiji trebati 3-4 godine da svoju privredu prevede na ratnu proizvodnju . On je smatrao da ce toliko i SAD morati da utroše vremena a da stalni kontakti SAD sa njima i molbe za smirivanje strasti pre izbijanja rata znace da je SAD totalno nespremna za rat i da ce Nemacka zavrsiti sav posao dok SAD bude bio u mogucnosti da krene u ozbiljnije operacije .

Problem je bio što su skoro svi ministri i generali bili poltroni i govorili musoliniju ono što je on hteo da cuje a ne pravu istinu . Cak kad bi mu neki od Generala i Ministara rekli kakvo je realno stanje on se drzao da on najbolje zna .

Grof Ciano istice Generale Gambaru i Roatu , komandante trupa u Rusiji te ministra privrede (zaboravih ime) kao jedine od ljudi na višim funkcijama koji su pokusavali da musoliniju daju prave informacije .

[baclawa]

Grof Ciano opisuje taj dogadaj otprilike ovako : Musolini je obavešten da ce Italiji trebati 3-4 godine da svoju privredu prevede na ratnu proizvodnju . On je smatrao da ce toliko i SAD morati da utroše vremena a da stalni kontakti SAD sa njima i molbe za smirivanje strasti pre izbijanja rata znace da je SAD totalno nespremna za rat i da ce Nemacka zavrsiti sav posao dok SAD bude bio u mogucnosti da krene u ozbiljnije operacije .

Problem je bio što su skoro svi ministri i generali bili poltroni i govorili musoliniju ono što je on hteo da cuje a ne pravu istinu . Cak kad bi mu neki od Generala i Ministara rekli kakvo je realno stanje on se drzao da on najbolje zna .

To se vidi i kroz "ton" pisama. Dok se Ruzvelt drzi uobicajene kulture diplomatskog razgovora i uporno insistira na diplomatskom resenju i razumu, Musolini mu u prvom pismu odgovara kao da diktira - po tackama, u drugom pismu odgovara sa ukupno tri recenice, dok oba potpisuje sa "Musolini"... Krajnja nekultura, netakticnost, nepoznavanje (i/ili ignorisanje) diplomatije - jednom recju zaslepljenost!